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Abstract
We construct a model with private information in which consumers write
dynamic contracts with …nancial intermediaries. A role for money arises due
to random limited participation of consumers in the …nancial market. Without
defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and variability of
wealth tend to fall in the steady state, and the welfare e¤ects of in‡ation are
very small. With defection constraints, it is optimal to eliminate currency
¤Rao Aiyagari died suddenly in May 1997. This draft of the paper was completed after his death,
and I hope that he would have approved of the …nal product, but I bear full responsibility for any
errors. I have bene…tted from the comments and suggestions of Young Sik Kim, Harry Paarsch, and
seminar participants at Johns Hopkins University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University
of Iowa, Victoria University of Wellington, the University of Canterbury, the University of Auckland,
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1entirely, the variability of wealth tends to rise with in‡ation, and the welfare
e¤ects of in‡ation are large.
21. INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this paper is to show how the theory of dynamic contracts under
private information can be extended to address issues in monetary economics. We
construct a dynamic risk-sharing model in which endowments are private information,
and where there are roles for money and for long-term credit arrangements. The
interaction between money and credit is analyzed, and we examine the implications
of the model for long-run optimal monetary policy. Solutions are computed, and we
measure the welfare e¤ects of in‡ation.
It is clear that credit instruments currently play an important role in the payments
systems of developed economies. Evidence from a Federal Reserve survey of house-
holds (Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell and Spindt 1987) indicates that non-cash trans-
actions accounted for 76% of the value of household transactions in the United States
in 1984. More recent evidence, compiled by the Bank For International Settlements
(1996), shows that, in the United States between 1991 and 1995, the nominal value
of payments by credit card increased by 81%, and the nominal value of transactions
over CHIPS and FedWire (electronic interbank transactions mechanisms) increased
by 30.1%.
A typical feature of most observed credit relationships is that they are long-term.
That is, it is usual for consumers and …rms to establish enduring relationships with
banks and other …nancial intermediaries, and there are good reasons for this. In
particular, long-term contractual arrangements permit the use of dynamic incentives,
which in turn promote e¢ciency. In this paper, we construct a model where dynamic
credit arrangements and …at currency are both useful in carrying out transactions,
and where credit can potentially be as important as it appears to be currently in the
U.S. economy.
We start with a credit paradigm, using it to derive a role for money, with money
3and credit coexisting. In particular, the environment we consider is in the spirit
of the literature on dynamic private information (Green 1987, Spear and Srivastava
1987, Phelan and Townsend 1991, Aiyagari and Alvarez 1995, Wang 1995, Aiyagari
and Williamson 1997). The basic model builds on Green (1987) in that there is
no aggregate risk, but individuals face random endowment shocks which are private
information. Here, a nonnegativity constraint on consumption and an endogenous
interest rate guarantee that a limiting distribution of wealth with mobility will exist.1
Consumers make long-term credit arrangements with …nancial intermediaries, and
they also have the opportunity to trade on a competitive money market in each
period. There is a transactions role for money which arises due to random limited
participation in the …nancial market. That is, timing within the period is such that
a consumer may contact the …nancial intermediary before full information on her
current income is available. It may then be desirable to transact on the money
market in order to smooth consumption. The notion of limited participation is similar
to the constructs used by Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992), though here this limited
participation occurs at random, and it is idiosyncratic; in each period some fraction
of consumers is subject to limited participation while the remaining fraction is not.
An important feature of the model is the defection constraints that arise in the
dynamic contracting problem of a …nancial intermediary. In any period, each con-
sumer has the option of defecting from her long-term contract with the …nancial
intermediary, and trading in each succeeding period on the competitive money mar-
ket. E¤ectively, the outside option for each consumer in defecting from the contract
with the intermediary, is to become a Bewley incomplete markets consumer, as in
Bewley (1980, 1983).
1In Green’s model, in the limit a vanishing fraction of the population receives all of the aggregate
endowment. Limiting distributions with mobility are obtained in Atkeson and Lucas (1994) with
exogenous lower bounds on expected utilities, and in Phelan (1995), with endogenous lower bounds.
4It is certainly not new to consider defection constraints in models with private in-
formation and dynamic contracts. For example, Atkeson and Lucas (1994) construct
a model with arbitrary defection constraints, while Phelan works with an environment
where endogenous defection constraints arise due to the outside option of defecting to
an alternative long-term contract. What is new here is that the value of the outside
option in our model depends on monetary policy. Speci…cally, the higher the in‡a-
tion rate, the lower the value of defecting to money market trading only. This creates
an interesting tension between two e¤ects of monetary policy. First, higher money
growth and in‡ation produce a standard e¤ect, in that consumers economize toomuch
on real money balances, they are then less able to insure against income risk, and the
gap between the steady state allocation and an e¢cient allocation widens. Second,
since higher money growth and in‡ation reduces the value of the outside option to a
consumer, the e¢ciency of long-term contracts with intermediaries tends to increase.
That is, since more severe penalties are open to a …nancial intermediary with higher
in‡ation, incentives tend to improve and there is a gain in e¢ciency. Whether the
…rst or second e¤ect dominates is a quantitative question.
As a benchmark, we …rst consider a pure credit model. This is a special case
where consumers are never subject to limited participation in the …nancial market,
and so money is not valued and defection is equivalent to going to autarky. We then
show that, in a version of the model without defection constraints, a version of the
Friedman rule holds. In particular, it is optimal (in that the allocation is identical
to the one for the pure credit allocation) for the money supply to grow at a rate
that equates the real rate of return on money and the real interest rate, but this
money growth rate does not equate the rate of return on money with the rate of time
preference.
We compute solutions, again starting with the benchmark pure credit economy.
Steady state allocations have the property that there is a well-de…ned limiting dis-
5tribution with mobility, which is certainly not the case in all dynamic private in-
formation contracting models (see for example Green 1987, Thomas and Worrall
1990, or Atkeson and Lucas 1992). The critical features of the environment that give
rise to a limiting distribution with mobility are that the interest rate is endogenous,
consumption is nonnegative, and that the economy has random endowments rather
than random preferences (see Aiyagari and Alvarez 1995). The defection constraints
are not important for this particular result, as we obtain limiting distributions with
mobility without these constraints.
Dropping defection constraints, in which case a Friedman rule is optimal, we exam-
ine the quantitative e¤ects of in‡ation on welfare and the distribution of consumption
and wealth (taking an agent’s expected utility as a proxy for wealth). Higher in‡ation
tends to reduce the variance of consumption and wealth for the population, though
the variance of consumption conditional on wealth tends to rise since the money mar-
ket is less useful for smoothing consumption at high rates of in‡ation. However, these
e¤ects are quantitatively small. For su¢ciently high money growth rates, money will
cease to be held in this model, but the cost of eliminating currency altogether is small.
Money will not be held for in‡ation rates in excess of about 1500 percent per annum.
Now, for the economy with defection constraints on intermediary contracts, the re-
sultsare quite di¤erent. Here, higher in‡ation tends to increase (rather than decrease)
the variability of wealth and consumption for the population as a whole. That is, the
e¤ect of in‡ation on the endogenous defection constraints dominates the standard
e¤ects of money growth. The quantitative e¤ects of in‡ation are large, and there is a
sense in which the economy without currency yields a steady state allocation closest
to the e¢cient allocation.
This is not the …rst paper to examine money and distribution in a dynamic model
with private information. Lucas (1992) compares the distributional implications of
cash-in-advance vs. an Atkeson-Lucas (1992) setup. Also, Taub (1994) studies a
6model with dynamic private information and risk neutrality where the optimal al-
location can be supported with money or with a bond market. Other work which
studies money and credit-type arrangements in models where memory is important
are Kocherlakota (1996) and Kocheralakota and Wallace (1997).
In Section 2 the model economy is constructed, and Section 3 looks at equilibrium
allocations. Section 4 contains a discussion of a pure credit economy as a benchmark,
and optimal monetary policy is derived. Section 5 discusses calibration and compu-
tational methods, and Section 6 contains a presentation of the computational results.
Section 7 is a conclusion.
2. THE MODEL






where 0 < ¯ < 1; ct is consumption, and u(¢) is the period utility function, with u(¢)
strictly increasing and strictly concave and u(0) = 0: We have ct ¸ 0 for all t: In
each period t, a consumer receives a random endowment yt; where yt 2 fy0;y1g with
0 · y0 < y1: Here, Pr[yt = y1] = ¼; where 0 < ¼ < 1: Endowments are i.i.d. over
time and across consumers, and they are private information.
At t = 0; consumers form coalitions, which we will denote …nancial intermedi-
aries. We assume that the intermediary is able to observe consumers’ assets (here,
their money balances) at the beginning of each period. Let consumers be indexed
by i 2 [0;1]: During any period, there are two possible modes of interaction between
consumer i and the …nancial intermediary, dictated by the realization of the idiosyn-
cratic random variable si
t 2 f0;1g; which is public information at the beginning of the
period. Assume that si
t is i.i.d. over time and across consumers, with Pr[si
t = 1] = ½;
where 0 · ½ · 1: If si
t = 1; then the consumer receives his/her current endowment
7yt at the beginning of the period, and then makes a report zi
t 2 fy0;y1g to the …nan-
cial intermediary concerning his/her endowment, following which the intermediary
makes a transfer of consumption goods ¿t to the consumer. Alternatively, if si
t = 0;
then at the beginning of period t the consumer receives y0 units of the consumption
good (in all states of the world), then obtains the goods transfer from the …nancial
intermediary, and then …nally receives y1 ¡ y0 units of the consumption good with
probability ¼ and zero units with probability 1¡¼: Note that in the second case the
…nancial intermediary can not make the transfer contingent on the total endowment
the consumer receives during the period. A positive transfer can be viewed as a with-
drawal from the consumer’s account with the …nancial intermediary, while a negative
transfer can be interpreted as a deposit.
The way in which consumers interact with …nancial intermediaries in this model
is similar to the limited participation structures in Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992).
For example, in Lucas’s model the member of the Lucas household who purchases
consumption goods is not able to access the …nancial market after a random open
market operation occurs in the …nancial market during the period. In our model,
limited participation occurs at random for individuals, and a constant fraction of the
population, 1 ¡ ½; is subject to limited participation in any given period. Random
limited participation is here intended to capture the idea that money is held to insure
against random circumstances where it is very costly or impossible to access the
technology which would allow a credit transaction.
Consumer i enters period t with Mi
t units of …at money, where Mi
0 is given. After
receiving transfers from the …nancial intermediary, consumers can trade money for
consumption goods on a competitive market, where the price of consumption goods
in terms of money is pt: The monetary authority makes a transfer of Tt units of …at
money per consumer to …nancial intermediaries at the beginning of the period.
In any period, after contacting the …nancial intermediary the consumer may aban-
8don the long-term credit contract. The alternative is to trade in the current period,
and each subsequent period, on the competitive money market, i.e. the consumer
then behaves in the same way as an agent in a Bewley-type incomplete markets econ-
omy where money is the only asset (see Bewley 1980, 1983). On defection, it is not
possible for the consumer to negotiate another contract with another intermediary;
intermediary contracts can be agreed to only at the …rst date. The possibility of
defection from the long-term contract leads to a set of defection constraints that the
contract must satisfy. In the subsequent analysis, we will determine steady state
equilibrium allocations with and without these defection constraints.
3. EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS
Letting ¹ Mt denote the per capita stock of …at money at the end of the period, the
monetary authority must meet the constraint
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That is, current per capita real balances minus per capita real balances in the previous
period divided by the gross rate of return on money must equal the per capita money
transfer to consumers in units of consumption goods.
We suppose that each intermediary can trade on a bond market, facing the sequence
of prices fqtg1
t=0 and the sequence of money prices of consumption goods fptg1
t=0: We
can think of the bond market involving trade in one-period bonds, which sell at
price
qt
1¡qt in period t, and pay o¤ 1
1¡qt+1 units of the consumption good in period
t + 1: Consumers can not trade on the bond market. De…ning mt ´
Mt
pt ; the real
balances of a consumer, we suppose that the consumers who are members of the
9…nancial intermediary agree on an initial distribution Ã0(w0;m0), i.e. a distribution
of expected utility entitlements w0 and real money balances m0 across the members
of the …nancial intermediary. Here, the initial distribution of money balances across
consumers is given, and expected utility entitlements are to be met through the design
by the …nancial intermediary of a transfer policy and a speci…cation of trading by
consumers on the money market.
Along the lines of Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1994), Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995), or
Aiyagari and Williamson (1997), we think of the …nancial intermediary as solving a
set of component problems to determine the optimal contractual arrangements with
each of its members. Speci…cally, there is a separate cost minimization problem that
the intermediary solves for each initial (w0;m0); facing fqtg1
t=0 and fptg1
t=0:We con…ne
attention to steady states, where qt = q; °t = °; and !t = ! for all t; where q; °; and
! are constants. Also, the distribution of expected utilities and real money balances
across consumers, Ã(w;m); is constant. Given that any intermediary has a positive
measure of consumers, each intermediary faces the same steady state distribution
Ã(w;m); and we can analyze this economy as if there were only one representative
…nancial intermediary.
The component planning problems can be speci…ed in recursive form by treating
w; the consumer’s expected utility, and m; his/her real money balances, as state
variables, and applying Green’s (1987) notion of temporary incentive compatibility.
Letting v(w;m) denote the expected discounted cost to the intermediary of delivering
a level of expected utility w at the current date to a consumer holding m units of real
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subject to
w = (1 ¡ ¯)
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½¼u(y1 + m + ¿1(w;m) ¡ °m11(w;m))
+½(1 ¡ ¼)u(y0 + m + ¿0(w;m) ¡ °m10(w;m))
(1 ¡ ½)¼u(y1 + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m01(w;m))
(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡¼)u(y0 + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m00(w;m))
3
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(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m+ ¿i(w;m) ¡ °m1i(w;m)) + ¯w1i(w;m) (4)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m+ ¿j(w;m) ¡°m1j(w;m)) + ¯w1j(w;m); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m)) + ¯w0i(w;m) (5)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0j(w;m)) + ¯w0j(w;m); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿i(w;m) ¡°m1i(w;m)) + ¯w1i(w;m) (6)
¸ ±(yi + m + ¿i(w;m)); i = 0;1;
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m)) + ¯w0i(w;m) (7)
¸ ±(yi + m + ¿(w;m)); i = 0;1;
11yi + m+ ¿i(w;m) ¡ °m1i(w;m) ¸ 0; i = 0;1 (8)
yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m) ¸ 0; i = 0;1
mij(w;m) ¸ 0; i;j = 0;1: (9)
Here, the transfer when the endowment is high [low] and si
t = 1 is ¿1(w;m) [¿0(w;m)];
while the transfer when si
t = 0 is ¿(w;m): The consumer is assigned an expected
utility for the following period, which is wjk(w;m) when si
t = j and yt = yk: The
intermediary also recommends a quantity of real balances that the consumer is to
carry into the next period, mjk(w;m); where the subscripts have the same meaning
as for the expected utility assignment. Recommended real balances then imply a
recommended transaction for the consumer on the money market.
The …nancial intermediary minimizes the present discounted value of goods trans-
fers to the consumer. The …rst constraint in the problem above, (3), is the promise-
keeping constraint, which states that contingent transfers, continuation expected
utilities, and recommend future money balances are consistent with the consumer
receiving expected utility w in the current period: Constraints (4) and (5) are incen-
tive compatibility constraints, which state that it not be in the consumer’s interest
to misreport his/her endowment to the …nancial intermediary. The constraints (6)
and (7) are defection constraints. That is, in each period, given the consumer’s initial
money balances, endowment, and transfer from the …nancial intermediary, it should
not be in the consumer’s interest to defect from the long-term contract with the …-
nancial intermediary and trade in each subsequent period on the money market. The
function ±(y) is the value of defecting with assets y, and is de…ned by the functional
equation
±(y) = max
m0 f(1 ¡ ¯)u(y ¡°m
0) + ¯[¼±(y1 + m




0 ¸ 0; (11)
12m
0 ¸ 0: (12)
Here, m0 is the quantity of real balances that the consumer would take into the next
period if she defected from the contract with the …nancial intermediary, (11) is a
nonnegativity constraint on consumption in the current period, and (12) is a nonneg-
ativity constraint on real balances. Finally, in the …nancial intermediary’s problem,
(8) and (9) are nonnegativity constraints on consumption and money balances, re-
spectively.
Note that the expected utility the consumer receives should she defect fromthe con-
tract with the …nancial intermediary is essentially expected utility in a Bewley-type
economy (see Bewley (1980, 1983)). That is, the long-term contract must guaran-
tee the consumer a path for expected utility that never falls below what could be
achieved in the Bewley allocation. It is immediately apparent from (10) that the
expected utility the consumer receives by defecting is decreasing in the gross in‡ation
rate, °: That is, ±(y) is decreasing in °; so that an increase in ° will tend to relax the
defection constraints (6) and (7).
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dÃ(w;m) = 0; (13)
i.e. net transfers among consumers through …nancial intermediaries and through the
money market must equal zero.
Note that money plays two roles here. First, money balances allow consumers to
self-insure against random limited participation in the …nancial market. This can be
interpreted as a transactions role for money. Second, current money balances com-
municate to the intermediary the endowment shock of the consumer in the previous
13period, so that money acts as a record-keeping device.2
Equilibrium allocations will have the property that q · °; as otherwise (13) would
not hold. That is, if q > °; …nancial intermediaries could make in…nite pro…ts by
borrowing on the bond market and having consumers acquire higher-yielding money
on the competitive money market. In the case where q < ° (i.e. money is strictly
dominated in rate of return), we will have mij(m;w) = 0 for i = 1 and for (i;j) =
(0;0): To see this, suppose that mij(m;w) > 0 for i = 1 and for some j: Then,
when si
t = 1 and yt = yj; the consumer trades o¤ claims to current consumption
for claims to future consumption by holding money balances. However, this can be
done more e¢ciently by the …nancial intermediary, which can reduce the consumer’s
transfers today and increase future transfers, while facing a higher interest rate. The
intermediary can thus meet all the constraints in the above optimization problem
while reducing the value of the objective function, so it cannot be optimal to have
mij(m;w) > 0 for i = 1. A similar argument holds for (i;j) = (0;0); given that
incentive compatibility requires that m01(m;w) ¸ m00(m;w):
While the problem (2) subject to (3)-(9) may appear formidable, it is possible to
simplify it considerably. First, suppose that we perform a change of variables by
letting ¿¤
i (w) = ¿i(m;w) ¡ m; for i = 0;1; with w¤
ij(w) = wij(w;m) and m¤
ij(w) =
mij(w;m) for i;j = 0;1: Now, we can write the cost function as
v(w;m) = ¡(1 ¡ q)m+ µ(w);
where µ(¢) is a function, and the choice variables ¿¤
i (w); i = 0;1; w¤
ij(w), and m¤
ij(w);
i;j = 0;1; are independent of m: Thus, the current consumption allocation, future
money balances, and future expected utility entitlement of the consumer are deter-
mined only by the current expected utility entitlement and the current endowment.
2The record-keeping role of money has been explored by Townsend (1987, 1989) in two-period
environments with spatial separation. See also Kocherlakota and Wallace (1997).
14For computational purposes, this simpli…cation is very important, as it allows us to
solve the …nancial intermediary’s problem as a one-state-variable problem rather than
as a two-state-variable problem.
4. A PURE CREDIT ECONOMY
In this section we wish to consider the special case where ½ = 1; so that money
is not valued in equilibrium. That is, money has value here only to the extent that
consumers require it to self-insure against random limited participation. If ½ = 1 and
money has no value, the expected utility from deviating from the long-term contract
with the …nancial intermediary is the current utility from consuming in the present
plus the discounted expected utility from autarky, i.e. ±(y) = (1¡¯)u(y)+¯[¼u(y1)+
(1 ¡ ¼)u(y0)] for all y: We can think of this special case as a pure credit economy.
The …nancial intermediary’s problem when ½ = 1 reduces to a problem which is
identical to the one considered by Green (1987), except that we have a nonnegativity
constraint on consumption, the interest rate is endogenous, and we impose defection
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w = (1 ¡ ¯)
·
¼u(y1 + ¿1(w)) + (1 ¡¼)u(y0 + ¿0(w))
¸
(15)
+¯[¼w1(w) + (1 ¡¼)w0(w)]
(1 ¡ ¯)u(y1 + ¿1(w)) + ¯w1(w) ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(y1 + ¿0(w)) + ¯w0(w) (16)
(1 ¡ ¯)u(y0 + ¿0(w)) + ¯w0(w) ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(y0 + ¿1(w)) + ¯w1(w) (17)
w1(w);w0(w) ¸ ¼u(y1) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(y0) (18)
15yi + ¿i(w) ¸ 0; for i = 0;1: (19)
Here, z(w) is the cost function, ¿1(w) [¿0(w)] is the transfer in the high (low) endow-
ment state, and w1(w) [w0(w)] is the expected utility entitlement in the following
period when the current endowment is high (low). Equation (15) is the promise-
keeping constraint, inequalities (16) and (17) are the incentive constraints, (18) are
the defection constraints, and (19) are nonnegativity constraints on consumption.
In the steady state, transfers must sum to zero across consumers. Thus, if Ã(w)
denotes the steady state distribution of expected utility entitlements, we must have
Z
[¼¿1(w) + (1 ¡ ¼)¿0(w)]dÃ(w) = 0: (20)
The pure credit economy is a useful benchmark, as we know that the steady state
allocation for this economy is e¢cient, and dominates any other allocation with ½ 6= 1.
That is, if ½ 6= 1 then random limited participation implies …rst, that consumption
must sometimes be smoothed ine¢ciently through the money market (or not at all if
money is not valued) rather than through the intertemporal credit mechanism o¤ered
by the …nancial intermediary. Second, since for any ° > 0 the value of defection will
weakly dominate autarky, and strictly dominate in the case where the consumerwould
choose to hold positive cash balances in some future state of the world if defection
occurs, the defection constraints will be more severe when ½ 6= 1: The …rst source of
ine¢ciency is a standard type of distortion caused by in‡ation, which will be re‡ected
in a suboptimal “quantity of money,” and a positive nominal interest rate. The second
source of ine¢ciency is more unconventional. Because consumers have an alternative
to the long-term contract with the …nancial intermediary, this puts constraints on
the types of contracts that intermediaries can o¤er. Further, since the alternative
involves trading on the money market, in‡ation will a¤ect the value of this outside
option.3
3Corbae and Blume (1995) have explored the idea that an outside option of trading on a com-
16Optimal Money Growth with No Defection Constraints
As a step towards evaluating the welfare e¤ects of in‡ation in this model, we …rst
consider e¢cient allocations in the absence of constraints (6) and (7). We will show
that a Friedman-rule result holds in this case.
We start by observing that, dropping (6) and (7) from the …nancial intermediary’s
problem, if we can …nd a value for ° such that an economy with ½ 6= 1 replicates the
steady state allocation with ½ = 1 (and here dropping constraint (18)); we can say
that the money growth rate ° ¡ 1 is optimal. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: When ½ 6= 1; ° = q is optimal.
Proof. First, conjecture that when ° = q; a solution to (2) subject to (3)-(9) (absent
(6) and (7)) is v(w;m) = z(w) ¡ (1 ¡ q)m; ¿1(w;m) = ¿1(w) ¡ m; ¿0(w;m) =
¿0(w) ¡ m; ¿(w;m) = ¿0(w) ¡ m; m01(w;m) =
¿0(w)¡¿1(w)
q ; mij(w;m) = 0 for
(i;j) = (1;1);(1;0);(0;0); wij(w;m) = wj(w) for i;j = 0;1; where [z (w); ¿1(w);
¿0(w); w1(w); w0(w)] is the solution to the pure credit problem, (14) subject to
(15)-(19), dropping (18). We have already shown that mij(w;m) = 0 for (i;j) =
(1;1);(1;0);(0;0): Now, substituting in the Bellman equation (2), we obtain
z(w) ¡ (1 ¡ q)m = min
8
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petitive money market can a¤ect the e¢ciency of long-term contracts in an environment without
private information. They show that money can be valued for no other reason than that it provides
this outside option, but the fact that it provides it implies that valued …at money is ine¢cient.
17Similarly, substituting in the constraints (3)-(8), we obtain the constraints (15)-(19),
and constraint (9) is also satis…ed. Thus, the solution to the …nancial intermediary’s
problem is the same for any ½ when ° = q: Now, it remains to be shown that in the
steady state the aggregate resource constraint, (13), is satis…ed. Substituting in (13),
and given (20), it is straightforward to show that this is the case.2
Thus, a Friedman rule is optimal here when there are no defection constraints.
That is, since the only monetary distortion in this special case is the standard type of
intertemporal distortion caused by in‡ation which exists in many monetary models
(cash-in-advance, and money-in-the-utility-function models, for example), it would be
surprising if a Friedman rule were not optimal. However, note that this Friedman rule
is modi…ed somewhat from its form in Friedman (1969). Here, it is optimal to equate
the real returns on the bond market (accessible only to …nancial intermediaries) and
the money market, as is consistent with Friedman (1969), but this need not involve
equating the rate of time preference of consumers with this rate of return. In general,
it will be the case that q > ¯ for the e¢cient pure credit allocation, as in Atkeson
and Lucas (1994) and Aiyagari and Williamson (1997).4
5. CALIBRATION AND COMPUTATION
We use the economy without defection constraints as a benchmark, setting pa-
rameters so that the steady state allocation matches observed features of the U.S.
economy. We interpret a period as one quarter, and set y0, y1; and ¼ so as to match
the variability in quarterly household income. Using PSID data, Aiyagari (1994)
argues that a …rst-order autoregression closely matches the time series properties of
4Note that transfers and real money balances are not uniquely determined when ° = q; since the
…nancial intermediary is indi¤erent when trading o¤ current for future consumption, between giving
the consumer less transfers in the present and more transfers in the future, and requiring the agent
to acquire money balances in the present and spend them in the future.
18annual earnings, with a range of .23 to .53 for the …rst-order serial correlation coef-
…cient, and a coe¢cient of variation in unconditional earnings of 20 to 40 percent.
Since it is not tractable to introduce serial correlation in endowments in this model,
we must do the best we can to …t an i.i.d. endowment shock in the model to the
data. This is not too problematic, as the estimated serial correlation in annual data
is low, and serial correlation for quarterly data would then be even lower. If we take
the coe¢cient of variation to be 30 percent for annual data, then if quarterly income
is i.i.d., the coe¢cient of variation for quarterly data would be 60 percent. Thus,
we set ¼ = :5; y0 = 1 ¡ ²; and y1 = 1 + ²; with ² = :6: The utility function we use
is u(c) = 1 ¡ e¡®c; with ® = 1; which implies a coe¢cient of relative risk aversion
of unity at the mean endowment. The constant relative risk aversion utility func-
tion is convenient for computational purposes here as it is bounded. The remaining
parameters, ½; ¯; and °; were set so as to produce an equilibrium steady state allo-
cation which would match observed average real interest rates, in‡ation rates, and
the observed use of currency in transactions. From the real business cycle literature
(Prescott 1986), the real interest rate is taken to be 1% per quarter, so in a steady
state we want q = :99: A survey of households by the Federal Reserve (Avery, El-
liehausen, Kennickell, and Spindt 1987), conducted in 1984, …nds that 24% of the
current value of household transactions is carried out in currency. In the model, the




f[1 ¡(1 ¡ ½)¼](m + !) + (1 ¡ ½)¼ j m + ! + ¡°m01(m;w) jgdÃ(m;w);




[½¼ j ¿1(m;w) j +½(1 ¡ ¼) j ¿0(m;w) j +(1 ¡½) j ¿(m;w) j]dÃ(m;w):
When the Federal Reserve survey was done, the in‡ation rate was approximately 1%
per quarter, so we set ° = 1:01 for calibration purposes.
19Solutions were computed for the economy without defection constraints as follows.
First, grids were chosen for the two state variables, w and m: The lower bound
on expected utility, w; is ¼u(y1 ¡ y0) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(0); which is the minimum incentive
compatible level of expected utility that can be imposed on a consumer, and the lower
bound on m is zero. Since choice variables in the …nancial intermediary’s problem are
independent of m; it is only necessary to solve the problem at each point along the w
grid, and for a single value for m; say m = 0; and then use this solution to determine
what the solution is for all points on the grid. We start with an initial guess for
q 2 (¯;1); and make an initial guess for the function µ(w): Then, value iteration is
used to arrive at the solution for µ(w) given q. At each iteration, µ(w) is updated
by …tting a third-order Chebychev polynomial (plus an additional term, 1
1¡w; which
performed well in …tting the points), to the values computed for the cost function at
points on the grid on the previous iteration. When convergence is achieved given q;
then the decision rules are interpolated across a …ner grid, and a matrix of Markov
transition probabilities for the state w is constructed as an approximation using a
lottery over the two closest grid points. A limiting distribution over w is computed,
the analogue of the left-hand side of (13) is evaluated, and q is updated according to
a bisection method. Then value-iteration is performed again, etc.
To match the observed real interest rate and the evidence from the Federal Reserve
survey on household transactions, we set ¯ = :99 and ½ = :81; in computing the
allocation for the economy without defection constraints: This implies that q = :99
(actually slightly greater than ¯; but the di¤erence is on the order of 10¡5) and that
currency accounts for 24% of the value of transactions.
The procedure for computing solutions with defection constraints is similar, but
…rst we need to use the functional equation (10) to determine the value function ±(y)
(again, using value iteration, and interpolation of the value function with a Chebychev
polynomial). Then, the lower bound for expected utilities for intermediary contracts
20is given by
w = ¼±(y1 ¡ y0) + (1 ¡ ¼)±(0):
Note that w ¸ ¼u(y1)+(1¡¼)u(y0) > ¼u(y1¡y0)+(1¡¼)u(0); the lower bound on
expected utilities without defection constraints. That is, without defection constraints
the worst incentive compatible treatment aconsumercould receive is togiveup y0 (the
low endowment) each period. With defection constraints, at worst the intermediary
could force the agent to give up y0 in the current period, with the consumer defecting
to the money market in each succeeding period. Once the consumer abandons the
long-term contract, she can do at least as well as autarky, which is better than giving
up y0 in each state at each date.
6. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
We …rst consider the pure credit case (i.e. ½ = 1) as a benchmark, noting that the
allocations here will be identical tothose with ½ 6= 1 and ° = q (a Friedman rule) when
there are no defection constraints. We then compare these benchmark allocations to
allocations with various in‡ation rates greater than the in‡ation rate for the Friedman
rule allocation, for the case with no defection constraints. Finally, we consider the
case with defection constraints, and look at similar in‡ationary experiments.
Pure Credit Economy
To get an idea of some of the general features of the solutions, it helps to look
at allocations with low discount factors. We …rst consider an economy with ½ =
1 (the pure credit case) and ¯ = :5; with the other parameters set as discussed
in Section 5. The results are in Figures 1-3. Figure 1 shows w1(w) (w1 in the
…gure) and w0(w) (w0 in the …gure). Here, note that, for low levels of w; future
expected utility remains at the lower bound on expected utilities, ¼u(y1 ¡ y0); when
21the consumer receives a low endowment in the current period. In general, given the
binding incentive constraint [(16) binds at the optimum, but (17) does not], expected
utility rises when the consumer receives a high endowment, and falls when there
is a low endowment. Figure 2 shows the limiting distribution of consumers across
expected utility entitlements. Here, note that a signi…cant fraction of consumers,
over 14%, are e¤ectively credit-constrained in that they are at the lower bound on
expected utilities. Half of these consumers, those with low endowments, will consume
zero, as we see in Figure 3. Note in Figure 3 that the gap between consumption in
the good state (c1) and consumption in the bad state (c0) is larger at the low end
of the distribution, where the binding lower bound on expected utilities mitigates
the incentives available to induce truthful reporting on the part of consumers. Due
to the low discount factor, intertemporal incentives are not very good, and there is
on average a fairly large gap between consumption in the high-endowment state and
consumption in the low-endowment state.
We next consider pure credit economies which are calibrated to the data. That
is, we use the same parameters as for the previous example, except that ¯ = :99:
Note again that the allocations here will be identical to what we would get with
½ 6= 1 and a Friedman rule in place. For the results, see Figures 4 and 5. We do
not show plots of w1(w) and w0(w) (as in Figure 1) as these functions are very close
to the 45-degree line. Figure 4 shows e¢cient steady state distributions of expected
utilities (w) across the population, for the cases where the defection constraints (18)
are imposed and where they are not. Note that the dispersion in expected utilities is
higher without the defection constraints. That is, the defection constraints impose a
lower bound on expected utilities, which eliminates the lower tail of the distribution.
Since the market-clearing condition (20) must hold, and since average consumption
(across endowment states) increases with w (see Figure 5), steady state q will tend
to adjust to cut o¤ the upper tail of the distribution as well, so that the imposition
22of defection constraints must reduce variability in w in the steady state. In Figure
4, we see that there are essentially no credit-constrained consumers in the steady
state either with or without defection constraints. This is due to the fact that, with
a high discount factor, the range of expected utilities for which a low endowment
will imply that next period’s expected utility is at the lower bound, is negligible,
in contrast to Figure 1. In Figure 5, where c0 (c1) denotes consumption in the
low (high) endowment state when there are no defection constraints, there is very
little variability in consumption, conditional on expected utility, i.e. in this sense the
solution is very close to perfect insurance. This re‡ects the fact that, since consumers
do not discount the future much, intertemporal incentives work very well. However,
note in Figure 4 that the variability in expected utilities is substantial. Therefore,
since the slopes of the consumption pro…les in Figure 5 are quite steep, this will
lead to high variability in consumption across the population. In the steady state,
the unconditional coe¢cient of variation of consumption is about 15%, while the
unconditional coe¢cient of variation of income is 60%, when there are no defection
constraints. With defection constraints, the unconditional coe¢cient of variation of
consumption is about 8%.
Money and Credit With No Defection Constraints
Here, we examine the e¤ects of in‡ation for the calibrated economy with no de-
fection constraints. We consider equilibrium allocations for in‡ation rates running
from the Friedman rule in‡ation rate (° = q) to an (incipient) in‡ation rate su¢-
ciently high to rule out a steady state monetary equilibrium. This latter equilibrium
is essentially an ine¢cient pure credit allocation where, with probability 1 ¡ ½; the
transfer to the consumer from the …nancial intermediary is noncontingent on income.
Table 1: ½ = :81; No Defection Constraints
23Annual In‡ation Rate Mean E.U. S.D. of E.U. S.D. of Cons. Cost of In‡ation
-3.94% .6270 .0519 .1508 0
10% .6270 .0515 .1549 0:07
100% .6262 .0500 .1908 0.04
1500% .6173 .0452 .2964 2.58
>non-mon. threshold .6156 .0450 .3066 5.47
The results are summarized in Table 1. Note that mean expected utility falls with
in‡ation, the standard deviation of expected utility falls, and the standard deviation
of consumption rises substantially. The last row of the table consists of results for
an in‡ation rate in excess of what is required to drive money out of the system, a
rate which is greater than 1500% per annum, but not by much. These results re‡ect
the fact that, as the in‡ation rate rises, money becomes a less e¢cient store of value,
and is therefore used less for insurance purposes. There is then less consumption
smoothing, the variability of consumption rises, and welfare falls. Figure 6 shows
consumption pro…les with 10% in‡ation in the state where the consumer is subject
to the limited participation problem, and cannot get insurance through the …nancial
intermediary (c01 is consumption when income is high, and c00 is consumption when
income is low). Here, note the di¤erence in the variability in consumption, conditional
on expected utility, relative to Figure 5. Due to the fact that there is less insurance,
intertemporal incentives are used less, and this tends to reduce the variability in
expected utilities across the population.
Evaluating the welfare e¤ects of in‡ation is somewhat problematic here, as we
need to deal with the whole distribution of expected utilities. We might consider
looking at a particular moment of the distribution, but this can lead to results that
do not make sense. For example, consider the optimal distributions in Figure 4,
with and without defection constraints, and suppose that we focus only on the mean
of the distribution. Mean expected utility without defection constraints is .6270,
24while mean expected utility with defection constraints is .6281, which might lead us
to conclude that the allocation with defection constraints dominates. However, we
know that the distribution without defection constraints and with ½ = 1 is the steady
state distribution for an e¢cient allocation, so using the mean of the distribution
would be inappropriate. Our approach here is to use a measure of the distance of the
limiting distribution of expected utilities from the optimal distribution as a measure
of the welfare cost of in‡ation. Since for the welfare measure we use it is necessary
that limiting probabilities be bounded away from zero, we use a kernel estimation
technique (Silverman 1986). That is, we estimate the density function f(x) associated










where h is the “window width,” ·i is the limiting probability associated with expected
utility level wi; n is the number of grid points for expected utilities, and K(¢) is a
probability density function. For K(¢); the standard normal density function provided
a good …t of the estimated density function to the limiting probabilities. Choosing a
grid for x; we let fj = f(xj) for j = 1;2; :::; `; and then compute the “welfare loss,”





where g(x) denotes the limiting distribution with pure credit (½ = 1). This distance
measure is adapted from an approach in information theory used by Kullback (1959).
The last column of Table 1 shows the welfare costs of in‡ation (using the above
distance measure). Note that these costs do not increase monotonically with in‡ation
(though at low levels of in‡ation and given the small e¤ects, this may just be com-
putational error), but they are small, in general. In fact, an examination of Figure
7 shows that the distribution of expected utilities in the economy where currency
25is driven out is not that di¤erent from the distribution under a Friedman rule (the
optimum).
Money and Credit With Defection Constraints
Table2 showsresultsforthe case with defection constraints imposed. Here, notethe
di¤erences with Table 1. With defection constraints, the variability in expected utility
(column 3) and in consumption (column 4) is considerably smaller. In the examples,
the participation constraint binds only at the lower bound on expected utilities, which
limits the incentives that …nancial intermediaries can give to consumers, especially
near this lower bound. Since part of the e¤ect of the participation constraint is to
eliminate the lower tail of the limiting distribution of expected utilities, and since
consumption increases with the level of expected utility, the interest rate must fall in
order for the bond market to clear in the steady state. That is, a lower interest rate
induces consumers (through intermediary contracts), to initially trade away claims
to future consumption, so that consumption tends to be lower in the steady state.
Note that, for low rates of in‡ation, the annualized interest rate (column 5 in Table
2) is considerably less than 4%, which is the interest rate for any in‡ation rate when
there are no defection constraints.
Table 2: ½ = :81; With Defection Constraints
Annual In‡ation Rate Mn. E.U. SD(EU) SD(Cons) Int. Rate Welfare Cost
-1.37% .6308 .0035 .0783 1.37% 478.56
10% .6313 .0056 .0635 3.35% 373.65
100% .6298 .0114 .0952 3.72% 130.54
1500% .6209 .0136 .2609 3.89% 60.87
>non-mon. threshold .6166 .0243 .2813 3.82% 12.58
Note also in Table 2 that, in contrast to Table 1, the mean level of expected utility
falls and the variability in expected utilities rises with the in‡ation rate. Variability
26rises due to the fact that the value of abandoning the intermediary contract for any
consumer falls with the in‡ation rate, which increases the opportunities for punishing
consumers for misreporting their incomes, increases the steady state interest rate, and
therefore increases opportunities for rewarding consumers as well.
With defection constraints, there are two e¤ects of in‡ation which have opposing
implications for welfare. First, as is the case when there are no defection constraints,
higher in‡ation tends to reduce real cash balances, which then reduces consumers’
ability to insure against income shocks in the state where they are subject to limited
participation. The variability of consumption conditional on expected utility goes
up, and the steady state allocation is therefore less e¢cient. Second, higher in‡ation
causes the value of the outside option (trading on the money market forever) to go
down, which is good for incentives, and therefore good for e¢ciency. Quantitatively,
we see in Table 2 that the second e¤ect is much larger than the …rst. That is, welfare
costs fall with in‡ation, since the steady state distribution gets closer to the optimum
as the in‡ation rate increases. The distribution which is closest to the optimum is the
one where currency is driven out of the system, i.e. where the economy operates with
credit only. This is a striking result, which is pictured in Figures 8 and 9. Figure 8
shows the Friedman rule distribution relative the optimum, and Figure 9 shows the
“no currency” distribution relative to the optimum.
The result from the economy with participation constraints that it would be e¢-
cient to eliminate the use of government-supplied currency, is something that we take
seriously. The bene…ts from the use of Federal Reserve notes in the U.S. economy
are small, as currency is used in a small fraction of the total value of transactions.
The cost of the use of currency is that there is little or no record-keeping associated
with currency transactions. Alternatively, when transactions take place through the
check-clearing system or by credit card, the record-keeping involved permits the use
of intertemporal incentive devices by …nancial intermediaries, which makes the pay-
27ments system work more e¢ciently. There may be a need in some transactions for a
mechanism which allows for decentralized transfer of wealth, but we currently have
a technology that permits this through privately-supplied smart cards.
In‡ation in an Economy With A Very Ine¢cient Credit System
The key results of the previous sections are …rst, that without defection constraints
the e¤ects of in‡ation are small, and with defection constraints the e¤ects are large.
Second, when thereare nodefection constraintsa Friedman rule is optimal, so that the
economy could operate e¢ciently with currency only, while with defection constraints
the economy operates most e¢ciently with credit only. Of course, these results were
obtained for a model which was calibrated to the U.S. economy, where currency
accounts for a relatively small fraction of the total value of transactions. One might
suspect that some of these results would change signi…cantly if we computed solutions
given parameter values which make money much more important in transactions. In
this subsection, we repeat the computations of the previous two subsections for an
economy where credit is as ine¢cient as possible, and money is as useful as it can be,
i.e. the case where ½ = 0:
Table 3: ½ = 0, No Defection Constraints
Annual In‡ation Rate Mn. E.U. SD(EU) SD(Cons) Welfare Cost
-3.94% .6270 .0519 .1508 0
10% .6277 .0499 .1732 2.63
100% .6239 .0416 .2244 2.31
>non-mon. threshold .5639 0 .6000 -
We set all parameters, except ½; at theirpreviousvalues. Table 3 shows solutions for
the case where there are no defection constraints. We did not compute results for high
rates of in‡ation (e.g. 1500% in‡ation as in Table 1), as this led to non-convergence
28problems. Note that, as one would expect, the e¤ects of in‡ation in Table 3 are much
larger than in Table 1. Given the in‡ation rate, the standard deviation of expected
utility is lower, the standard deviation of consumption is higher, and the welfare cost
of in‡ation is higher with ½ = 0: For the nonmonetary economy, in the last row of
Table 3, the steady state distribution of expected utilities is indeterminate. That is,
if currency is not used, then there is no means for insuring against income shocks,
so that an individual’s expected utility will remain constant over time, with the level
of expected utility determined by the transfer that the consumer receives from the
…nancial intermediary each period. One steady state distribution is for each consumer
to receive a transfer of zero each period, so that everyone consumes autarkically, and
this is the distribution used in calculating the statistics in the last row of Table 3.
Table 4: ½ = 0;With Defection Constraints
Annual In‡ation Rate Mn. E.U. SD(EU) SD(Cons) Int. Rate Welfare Cost
-1.37% .6308 .0035 .0783 1.37% 487.56
10% .6308 .0058 .0781 2.09% 385.03
100% .6261 .0093 .1802 3.79% 122.25
>non-mon. threshold .5639 0 .6000 - -
Table 4 shows results for ½ = 0 when defection constraints are imposed. Here, as
compared to Table 2, the e¤ects of in‡ation are not necessarily larger when ½ = 0:
The standard deviation of consumption is higher for each in‡ation rate as, conditional
on the level of expected utility the probability of non-participation is much higher (1
as compared to .19 in Table 2), and the variability of consumption is much higher
conditional on non-participation, for an in‡ation rate above the Friedman rule rate.
The welfare cost of in‡ation is higher for 10% in‡ation in Table 4, and higher for
100% in‡ation in Table 2. Further, the standard deviation of expected utilities is
higher for 10% in‡ation in Table 4, and higher for 100% in‡ation in Table 2. In terms
of the welfare costs of in‡ation, these costs are not minimized in Table 4 at a rate of
29in‡ation below 100%, so some of the ‡avor of the results for the model calibrated to
U.S. data remain. The key di¤erence here is that an economy without currency (the
last row in Table 4) can not be more e¢cient than having some in‡ation rate such that
currency is held, as the no-currency economy is autarkic. The optimal in‡ation rate,
according to the welfare metric we are using here, would be something between 100%
and approximately 1700% per annum. Again, we could not get a precise estimate
of this optimal in‡ation rate because of non-convergence problems at high in‡ation
rates.
7. CONCLUSION
We have constructed a model of money and credit with dynamic private infor-
mation, and examined the implications of this model for the e¤ects of in‡ation on
welfare, the distribution of consumption, and the distribution of wealth. Consumers
have random unobservable endowments and write long-term contracts with …nancial
intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation. That
is, contact with …nancial intermediaries is such that consumers are not always able
to smooth consumption adequately with credit, and instead must sometimes resort
to currency transactions.
The key …ndings relate to how defection constraints, arising from the option con-
sumers have of abandoning contracts with …nancial intermediaries in favor of spot
trading on the money market, alter the e¤ects of changes in the money growth rate
in the steady state. In particular, in the absence of defection constraints a Friedman
rule is optimal, and increases in the money growth rate and in‡ation tend to reduce
the mean level of expected utility and the variability in expected utility across the
population and to increase the variability in consumption. The e¤ects of in‡ation are
small. Alternatively, with defection constraints the results change dramatically. In
general, defection constraints tend to reduce the variability in expected utility across
30the population. Higher in‡ation tends to increase the variability in expected utilities,
while (according to the metric used) pushing the steady state allocation closer to
the optimum. In this case, it is e¢cient to eliminate the use of currency altogether,
as this improves incentives in …nancial contracts, and the resulting welfare bene…ts
outweigh the costs resulting from less e¢cient risk sharing in the absence of money.
Our results are of course sensitive to the information structure we have assumed.
First, if we assumed that there was private information concerning preference shocks
rather than endowments, as for example in Atkeson and Lucas (1992), then we would
not obtain a steady state limiting distribution with mobility in the case without
defection constraints. However, the defection constraint case would yield qualitatively
similar results with preference shocks. What makes preference shocks unattractive
for this application is that a preference shock model will yield allocations where
consumption is more variable than income (assuming …xed incomes), which is at
odds with observation. Preference shocks do have the advantage, however, that it is
more plausible that they be unobservable than that incomes be unobservable.
Second, it is clearly important that we have assumed that money balances are
observable. This assumption is key to the model’s tractability, but it lacks super…cial
plausibility. In practice individual cash balances would seem to be quite di¢cult to
observe. Further, some results in the literature (e.g. Cole and Kocherlakota 1997)
suggest that, if assets can be hidden, then e¢cient allocations are identical to what
can be achieved in an incomplete markets economy where all trade in contingent
claims is shut down. These results, though limited to …xed-interest-rate economies,
could be interpreted as having negative consequences for private information theory.
That is, we might ask why we should go to the work of analyzing a complicated private
information economy rather than saving some trouble and analyzing a related, and
much simpler, incomplete markets setup. In defense of our model, it might be possible
to consider a setup where money can be hidden, but it is in everyone’s interest to
31reveal their true cash balances (note that allocations have the property that higher
cash balances are always associated with a higher expected utility entitlement), and
where the allocation does not collapse to the incomplete markets allocation. This
approach, however, is beyond what we know how to do. Of course, assets in practice
are neither perfectly observable or perfectly unobservable, so the issue of what works
better for particular applications, incomplete markets models or private information
models, will depend on the question we have in mind, and the quantitative factors
that play a role in answering the question. We intend to explore this idea further in
future work.
Given the novel approach to modeling money and credit here, there are many
possible extensions. It would be interesting to explore issues related to capital ac-
cumulation,5 an extension that would be relatively straightforward, or to investigate
business cycle phenomena and cyclical monetary policy, which would require some
additional theoretical advances.
5Aiyagari and Williamson (1997) is a private information model of dynamic contracts with capital
accumulation but without monetary exchange.
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